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Before 1992 mortgage interest in Italy was fully tax deductible up to 3,500 Euro (7,000 for two cosigners). In 
1992-94 the government implemented a series of tax reforms whose ultimate effect was to cancel the relation 
between the after-tax mortgage rate and the marginal tax rate. Using data from the 1987-2000 Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth we test if the cancellation of incentives has reduced the propensity to borrow of 
high-income taxpayers relative to the other population groups. Difference-in-differences estimates and 
regression analysis indicate that tax considerations have not affected the demand for mortgage debt, either at the 
extensive or intensive margin. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The theory of portfolio taxation suggests that investors’ portfolio choices are affected by 
the after-tax returns on each asset, and that the differing fiscal treatment of the various assets 
creates wedges in the structure of the returns. The empirical literature for the US, as summarized 
by Poterba (2001), appears to support the view that taxes affect asset selection and allocation. 
Evidence on households’ response to changes in the tax treatments of debt is far more limited. 
In this paper we bring new evidence to the effect of the tax treatment of household 
liabilities by studying the effect of changes in the tax treatment of mortgages on the propensity to 
borrow and on the amount borrowed. The change that we consider is the cancellation of tax 
incentives in the Italian mortgage market for borrowers with high marginal tax rates. We use 
repeated cross-sectional data drawn from the 1987-2000 Bank of Italy Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW). The survey, which is representative of the Italian population, 
contains microeconomic data on mortgage debt, after-tax income and demographic variables. 
The richness of our data and the features of the tax reform provide a truly unique setting 
for spotlighting the effect of tax incentives on borrowing in particular, and on household portfolio 
selection and allocation more generally. From 1982 to 1992 mortgage interests were fully tax-
deductible up to approximately 3,500 Euro (7 million lire), so that the tax incentives was 
proportional to the borrower's marginal tax rate. In 1992 the link with the marginal tax rates was 
broken, and the incentive made proportional to interests paid (a flat rate of 27 percent, lowered to 
22 percent in 1994 and 19 percent in 1998). As a consequence, after 1992 the incentive to borrow 
was substantially reduced for the rich, slightly increased for the poor, and unchanged for 
borrowers in the intermediate tax brackets. 
These group-specific tax changes provide the ground for our empirical analysis and for the 
identification of the effect of the tax reform. Theory predicts that the decisions to borrow and of 
how much to borrow are affected, among other variables, by the after-tax interest rate on 
borrowing. However, since the after-tax borrowing rate depends on the taxpayer's marginal 
income tax rate, which is inherently correlated with the level of income, it is difficult to 
disentangle genuine variation in after-tax interest rates, for given income, from genuine variations 
in income, for given after-tax interest rates. In the absence of tax incentives this is actually   1 
impossible if, at any point in time, all borrowers face the same interest rate. When the interest 
rate varies across borrowers, it is generally not observed. And even when it is observed, cross-
sectional variability in the price of borrowing tends to be correlated with other household 
characteristics. 
The 1992-94 Italian tax reforms create exogenous variability in after-tax interest rates on 
borrowing that can be exploited to identify the effects of changes in interest rates on household 
debt. In particular, if the tax reform had an impact on the decision to borrow and on the amount 
borrowed, it should emerge among households in the highest and lowest tax brackets after 1992. 
The results have important implications that go far beyond the specificities of mortgage 
markets or household liabilities. Under the pressure of unsustainable financial prospects, several 
European countries have implemented pension reforms and introduced incentive schemes for 
private retirement saving. Studying if and how households react to tax incentives is of paramount 
importance for understanding the effectiveness of the incentive. 
The paper has six more sections. Section 2 reviews previous studies on tax incentives to 
borrow, with particular reference to the US 1986 tax reform and the phasing out of the MIRAS 
program in the UK. Section 3 provides institutional background on the Italian mortgage market 
and explains how the 1992-94 reforms affected the tax treatment of mortgage interest. Section 4 
presents the data used in the empirical analysis, and Sections 5 and 6 the econometric results. 
There turns out to be no detectable effect of the tax reforms on the demand for mortgage debt or 
the amount borrowed. Section 7 concludes suggesting various explanations for these findings, 
such as the role of information. 
 
 
2. International evidence 
  
In many countries the tax code gives preferential treatment to mortgages, as part of 
broader government intervention to subsidize housing. There are several reasons that justify 
housing incentives. One of the most compelling is that housing is an investment good; hence tax-
deductible capital costs are in principle offset by imputed rental values. In practice the offset is   2 
modest, as the market value on which imputed rents are computed is underestimated. So the main 
goal of these programs is to shift the portfolio allocation of wealth towards goods to which 
society assigns an important weight in creating positive externalities and raising living 
conditions, much like targeting retirement saving is a remedy to household myopia and potential 
free-riding problems.  
Arguments to discriminate in favor of one type of housing tenure (homeownership against 
renting) are much weaker.
1 In this paper we take the system of incentives as given and do not 
address important questions such as whether the tax code should favor housing in the first place, 
whether incentives for homeownership should be higher than those for renting, and how 
homeownership could be promoted. 
Poterba (2001) provides international evidence on the type of borrowing incentives for 
house purchase that exist in nine OECD countries. Three countries, the US, the Netherlands, and 
France, allow relatively unrestricted deductions for mortgage interest, and a fourth, Italy, allows 
mortgage interest deductions for first-time homeowners only.
2 In Japan taxpayers are not allowed 
to deduct mortgage interest payments, but enjoy a special tax credit for first-time home purchase, 
subject to a time limit. 
Historically, the UK featured one of the most generous mortgage incentives programs 
(MIRAS, or Mortgage Interest Relief at Source). Over time, the treatment of mortgage interest 
was subject to considerable changes. Before 1983, the interest on the first £30,000 of a mortgage 
was deductible from taxable income. In April 1983, the MIRAS scheme was introduced and 
initially provided two sources of variability in the after-tax mortgage interest rate. Under MIRAS, 
a borrower paid the lender the interest less the tax relief, initially equal to the marginal tax rate. 
Moreover, until 1988 the £30,000 limit applied on single mortgagers rather than the property, so 
married people could each receive relief on loans up to £30,000, including more than one on the 
same property. 
The MIRAS scheme was criticized as a strongly distortionary measure introducing a bias 
in favor of owner-occupation and in favor of higher income households who are more likely to 
                                                 
1 Major features of housing taxation include the tax treatment of mortgage interest rates and capital gains from sales, 
inclusion of imputed rents in taxable income, and local taxation. 
2 In the US households cannot deduct interest on more than $1,000,000 of mortgage debt, but in practice this 
constraint rarely binds.   3 
finance large houses. Moreover, the relief was believed to result in higher house prices, which 
prevented new homebuyers from gaining fully from it. This led to several reductions in the relief 
rate that culminated with the phasing out of MIRAS in April 2000.
3 As we shall see, some of the 
developments in MIRAS parallel the series of reforms in the tax treatment of mortgage interests 
in Italy. The tax change that we analyze might therefore prove useful to understand the portfolio 
effects of MIRAS as well. 
Another important tax change that affected household liabilities was the US Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. That reform phased out deductions for interest on consumer credit - on the ground 
that they provided an incentive to invest in consumer durables rather than assets, which produce 
taxable income - while maintaining the residential mortgage interest deduction - on the ground 
that homeownership is an important policy goal. In short, the tax reform increased the price of 
borrowing through mortgages relative to consumer debt. Since there was no restriction on the use 
of home equity debt, homeowners were given an incentive to shift from consumer debt into 
mortgage debt. The incentive was higher for high-income households, who are subject to high 
marginal tax rates and more likely to itemize deductions. 
The 1986 reform stimulated some empirical studies on the effect of changing the after-tax 
borrowing rate on consumer credit (Engen and Gale, 1996; Skinner and Feenberg, 1990; Scholz, 
1994). The common finding of these studies is that household debt composition is sensitive to the 
tax treatment of different types of debt. Maki (2001) provides the most recent and careful 
analysis of the effect of the change in tax treatment of consumer credit on the demand for 
mortgages. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey he concludes that after the reform 
high-income homeowners reduced consumer interest paid and increased mortgage interest paid 
relative to other households. On the other hand, high-income earners who were not homeowners 
and had therefore no access to home equity borrowing, did not reduce their consumer interest 
paid relative to other renters. 
                                                 
3 Hendershott, Pryce and White (2002) use a sample of loans originated in the UK to predict the probability that a 
loan exceeds the £30,000 limit. These probabilities are used to construct debt tax penalty variables that are then 
related to the LTVs on loans to finance home purchase. The authors find that the removal of deductibility has 
reduced the initial LTVs by about 30 percent.   4 
3. The reform of the tax treatment of mortgage interest 
 
Despite the increasing competitive pressure of European banks on financial intermediaries 
operating in the domestic market and the growth of the past two decades (the household debt-
income ratio increases from 9 percent in 1985 to 19 percent in 2000), by international standards 
mortgage debt in Italy is relatively low. Chiuri and Jappelli (2001) document that the down 
payment and the cost of foreclosure in Italy are higher than in countries at a similar level of 
financial development. A further reason for the relatively thin mortgage market is the presence of 
informal arrangements and various forms of intergenerational transfers (bequests, inter vivos 
transfers, help for down payment or outright purchase, free housing or co-residency), partly 
overcoming borrowing constraints and reducing the need for mortgage credit. 
In this paper we do not attempt at explaining the broad trends in Italian mortgage markets. 
Rather, we study if, given the institutional setting and existing constraints, borrowers have 
perceived the changes in the specific features of the tax treatment of mortgage interest. 
Table 1 summarizes the series of tax reforms that took place in the mortgage market in the 
past two decades. In 1982 the tax code introduced substantial incentives for mortgage loans. 
Mortgage interests up to 7 million lire per year (about 3,500 Euro) were made deductible from 
the borrower's general income tax base. Eligibility applied to first-time buyers and repeat buyers 
as well, and to mortgages incurred not only for home purchase, but also repairs, additions and 
new constructions (in these cases interests up to about 2,000 Euro were deductible). In that tax 
regime the price of mortgage debt was  () i i r f t - 1 , where r denotes the mortgage interest rate,  i t  
taxpayer's i marginal tax rate, and  i f  household's i fraction of deductible interests: 100 percent if 
mortgage interest payments did not exceed niL Euro (where ni denotes the number of taxpayers 













, 1 min f , where Pi denotes mortgage interest payments.  
In 1992 the tax incentive became a flat 27 percent of the interest paid, and the price of 
mortgage debt changed to  () ' 27 . 0 1 i r f - . With respect to the pre-1992 regime, the incentive to 
borrow was thus raised for investors with the lowest marginal tax rate, lowered for those with the   5 
highest marginal tax rate, and unaffected for those in the intermediate tax brackets. The tax 
reform also envisioned different tax provisions for contracts signed before or after 1993. Before 
1993 the 3,500-euro limit applied to each taxpayer co-signing the contract; after 1993 to the 











, 1 min ' f ). The tax incentive was then further reduced to 22 
percent in 1994 and 19 percent in 1998, with the limit still fixed, at least in nominal terms. 
Since the effect of the reforms depends on the borrower's position in the tax distribution, 
Table 2 reports the tax brackets in place between 1987 (the first year of our sample) and 2000. 
Three changes are worth noticing. In 1989 the highest two tax brackets were eliminated and 
marginal tax rates reduced for all brackets but the second. In 1990-92 tax brackets were indexed 
to inflation. Finally, in 1992 marginal tax rates were raised by one percentage point for all but the 
bottom two brackets. 
The change in incentives to borrow induced by the 1992-94 tax reforms was substantial, 
especially for borrowers in the top tax brackets. To illustrate these effects, in the top panel of 
Figure 1 we plot the yearly difference between the interest paid on a mortgage with no tax 
incentive and a tax-favored mortgage instrument for a borrower paying interests of 3,500 Euro 
for 10 years (the typical duration of mortgage contracts in Italy over the sample period). We 
assume that the mortgage is a fixed-rate mortgage at the 12 percent interest rate, approximately 
the rate prevailing in 1992-94. 
In the pre-1992 regime the price of borrowing declines linearly with the marginal tax rate. 
A borrower with a marginal tax rate of 33 percent faces an after-tax borrowing rate of 8 percent; 
in the top bracket, the after-tax rate is 6 percent, and 11 percent in the bottom one. After 1992 the 
tax incentive is a flat 945 Euro for all tax brackets (0.27´3,500), so the after-tax rate is 8.8 
percent, regardless of the tax rate. The 1994 reform reduced the incentive to 770 Euro 
(0.22´3,500), further lowered to 665 Euro in 1998 (0.19´3,500). In the example, the after-tax rate 
increases to 9.4 and 9.7 percent, respectively. 
In the lower panel of Figure 1 we consider the effect of the reform for those with mortgage 
interest above the L=3,500 limit, assuming that the borrower is paying interests of 7,000 Euro for 
10 years. The graph shows that the change in the price of borrowing induced by the reform 
depends also on the number of taxpayers in each household. Between 1992 and 1993 in the top   6 
tax bracket the price of borrowing increases by 4.38 percentage points for households with two 
taxpayers, and by 1.38 points for single taxpayers. In the lowest tax bracket, the price of 
borrowing declines by abut half a percentage point for multiple taxpayers and by slightly more 
than one point for single taxpayers. 
The abrupt cancellation of the tax incentive for the rich and the greater incentive given to 
low-income households should have reduced the former's propensity to borrow relatively to the 
latter's and relatively to the control group of households in the intermediate tax brackets. 
Furthermore, the increase in the price of borrowing is higher for households with two or more 
income recipients - who lost the possibility of double tax deductions - than for single income 
households. Our empirical strategy is thus to divide the sample into groups affected and 
unaffected by the reforms, according to their marginal tax rate and number of taxpayers, and to 
test whether the reform had any effect on mortgage debt of the groups affected. 
The validity of the proposed test rests on some assumptions: (1) the tax reform is 
exogenous with respect to the decision to borrow, (2) it is exogenous with respect to changes in 
sample composition, (3) there are no group-specific trends in the propensity to borrow, and (4) 
there are no simultaneous credit supply shifts correlated with the reform (for instance, a credit 
crunch affecting taxpayers differently). 
As far as assumption (1) is concerned, we believe that the possible endogeneity of the 
reforms can be safely ruled out. The reforms were not implemented in order to offset the different 
paths of borrowing by taxpayer groups (if this had been the case, there would be a problem of 
policy endogeneity). Rather, the 1992 reform was part of a major deficit-reduction package, 
prompted by a severe political crisis coupled with the dramatic devaluation of the lira; and it was 
followed shortly by the deepest recession of the post-war era.
4 
Assumption (2) posits that shifts in sample composition are exogenous with respect to the 
decision to borrow (and to the amount borrowed). In essence, we require that movements across 
the tax distribution (into higher or lower brackets) are independent of borrowing decisions, i.e. 
                                                 
4 The 1992 reform of the tax treatment of mortgage interest payments mirrors, in structure and timing, the reform of 
the tax incentives to life insurance. In previous work we analyzed the effect of this reform on the decision to 
purchase life insurance and found that it had no impact on the decision to purchase life insurance or on the 
contribution rate (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2002). We considered as likely explanations minimum investment 
requirements, borrowing constraints, lack of commitment to long-term saving and of financial information about tax 
incentives.   7 
that borrowers did not move within the income distribution as a result of the tax reform itself. 
Before 1993 for people at the margin a tax deduction of 3,500 Euro may actually change the 
relevant tax bracket. On this front, we present evidence that our results are robust to possible tax 
bracket shifts induced by the reform. 
Assumption (3) avoids attributing to the tax reform the effect of underlying trends in the 
decision to borrow that differ across groups. Since our data spans both pre- and post-reform 
years, we can check the validity of this assumption by including group-specific time trends in 
estimation. Finally, assumption (4) rules out a simultaneous shift of the supply of loans. In the 
empirical test, however, we control for aggregate-wide changes in the supply of credit with the 
inclusion of time dummies. 
 
4. The data 
 
The 1987-2000 SHIW provides a unique opportunity to test the effect of the tax reform on 
the demand for mortgage loans. Conducted by the Bank of Italy in 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 
1998 and 2000, it spans pre- and post-reform years. In each year it contains information on 
outstanding mortgage debt, income, and demographic variables. Each survey collects data on a 
representative sample of about 8,000 households. We drop the self-employed, whose debt is more 
likely to be business-related and exclude the 1993 transitional year. Our final sample includes 
almost 40,000 observations. Ideally, we would like to observe mortgage loans and pre-tax interest 
paid for home acquisition of first-time buyers. In practice we observe outstanding debt for home 
acquisition or repairs of all borrowers and do not observe interest paid. 
To classify households according to mortgage incentives, we need to impute the marginal 
income tax rate. In estimating this tax rate one should consider that it might be affected by the 
structure of household portfolios, a problem pointed out by Poterba and Samwick (1999). 
Although in Italy income from most financial assets (such as bank deposits, mutual funds and 
government bonds) is subject to a flat rate withholding tax, dividends and income from capital 
(e.g., rents) enter the general income tax base and therefore affect marginal tax rates. And as we   8 
have pointed out, part or all of the mortgage interest can be deducted. This generates potential 
correlation with the overall marginal tax rate and portfolio choice. We therefore estimate 
marginal tax rate only on the basis of labor income, excluding income from capital. 
Since the incentive to borrow applies to individual borrowers, we proxy the investor's 
marginal tax rate with that of the household head's labor income, using the tax brackets and 
marginal rates reported in Table 2. The SHIW collects data on after-tax wages, salaries, self-
employment income, income from capital and income from financial assets so imputation of tax 
brackets is straightforward. 
In Figure 2 we plot the aggregate ratio of outstanding mortgages and household disposable 
income, drawn from the SHIW and aggregate financial accounts, respectively. Both series show 
an increasing trend in the debt-income ratio (mortgage debt doubles between 1987 and 2000). 
However, there are some discrepancies between the two series: the microeconomic data do not 
signal the vigorous growth of the late 1990s evident from the aggregate statistics. This is likely 
due to comparability problems. The financial accounts of the household sector do not provide a 
breakdown of total debt into mortgage debt and consumer credit on a consistent basis over time. 
The series plotted in Figure 2 refers to total financial liabilities of households, unincorporated 
business with less than 5 employees and no-profit organizations over 12 months of maturity. In 
contrast, the SHIW data include only household mortgage debt (rather than all liabilities), 
regardless of maturity. 
Figure 3 plots the proportion of borrowers in 1987-2000 by marginal income tax rates. The 
proportion shifts with the tax rate, indicating that the decision to borrow is correlated with 
income. For instance, in 2000 only 5 percent of those in the lowest tax brackets had a mortgage, 
compared with 19 percent in the highest brackets. There is no clear trend in the propensity to 
borrow in the lowest tax bracket, a slowly increasing trend of those in the t=0.22 tax bracket, and 
a decreasing trend of those in the t=0.27 bracket. For the highest brackets the fraction of 
households with a mortgage increases between 1987 and 1991, flattens out until 1995, and 
declines afterwards. The debt-income ratios plotted in Figure 4 displays similar trends.
5 
                                                 
5 Analyzing the amount borrowed as well as the decision to borrow is important if households respond to the increase 
in the price of borrowing induced by the reform buying smaller housing units, rather than reducing the frequency of 
mortgage loans.   9 
As is explained in Section 3, the 1992-94 reforms should have reduced the tax incentive to 
borrow for the rich and increased it for the poor. The descriptive evidence presented in Figures 3 
and 4 indicates that mortgage debt is lower for the poor and higher for the rich, and that the rich 
experienced a decline in the propensity to borrow and in the amount borrowed after 1995. But 
this cannot be taken as evidence either for or against the hypothesis that taxation affects 
borrowing, because different characteristics across groups and group-specific trends could mask 
the effect of the reform. 
In the remaining of the paper we use a difference-in-difference estimator and regression 
analysis to test the hypothesis that the propensity to borrow of the poor has increased faster than 
that of the rich after the reform and that, for any given marginal tax rate, multiple income 
households have reduced the propensity to borrow more than single income households.  
 
 
5. Difference-in-differences results 
 
To study the effect of the 1992-94 reforms we identify a group of households unaffected 
by the reforms and one or more groups potentially affected by the new tax regime. Using 
standard terminology, we call the former the "control" group, and the latter the "treatment" 
groups. We illustrate the difference-in-difference estimator in relation to the effect of the tax 
reform on the amount borrowed by the group of rich taxpayers. 
Denote by  t g i b , 0 Î  ( t g i b , 1 Î ) mortgage debt of borrower i in the control group g0 (treatment 
group g1) in period t. Between period t and t' a tax reform takes place that changes borrowers' tax 
incentive in the treatment group. For instance, the 1992-94 reforms affect the treatment group of 
rich tax-payers (with a marginal tax rate greater than 0.22) by eliminating the link between after-
tax returns and marginal tax rates, but not the control group (those with a marginal tax rate equal 
to 0.22). 
We assume that before the reform the demand for mortgage debt is: 
   10 
t g i g t t g i j j j v f b , , Î Î + + = b  
 
for j={0,1}. Both groups are subject to an aggregate shock bt. Long-term differences between 
groups are captured by the fixed effects 
0 g f  and 
1 g f . In the absence of such differences across 
groups, the average debt is equal for g0 and g1. After the tax reform the demand shifts for both 
groups: 
  
{} ' , ' ' , 0 t g i g t t g i j j j v j f b Î Î + ¹ ´ + + = 1 d b  
 
where 1{.} is an indicator function that equals 1 if the statement in bracket is true and zero 
otherwise. According to this specification, the reform affects mortgage debt by an amount d in 
the treatment group. Given this structure, one can identify the effect of the reform using the 
difference-in-difference estimator: 
 
d = - - - Î Î Î Î ) ( ) ( , ' , , ' , 0 0 1 1 t g i t g i t g i t g i b b E b b E  
 
The identifying assumption, then, is that controlling for group and time effects, the error 
term v has mean zero. Note that panel data are not required to compute the conditional means that 
form the basis of the difference-in-difference estimator. What we need to observe is a 
representative sample of the two groups g0 and g1 in each of the two periods t and t'. For our 
purposes therefore one can rely on repeated cross-sectional data. 
Since time effects are common to both groups, in the pre-reform period t the control and 
treatment groups differ only in long run fixed effects, ()
0 1 g g f f - . Thus, the model is consistent 
with the fact that high-income borrowers behave differently than those in low tax brackets, 
regardless of policy interventions. In the post-reform period t' the treatment group now differs not 
only because of fixed effects, but also because of the tax reform () d + -
0 1 g g f f . 
A finding that d < 0 signals that the reform has reduced the propensity of rich tax-payers to 
borrow relatively to the control group. By appropriately redefining the variable b or the treatment   11 
group g1, one can readily extend this framework to examine the propensity to borrow rather than 
the amount borrowed and the separate behavior of the low-income group after the reform (where 
theory suggests d > 0). 
In Tables 3 and 4 we report separate estimates for the effect of the 1992-94 reforms on the 
decision to borrow and the amount borrowed, respectively. The pre-reform period is 1987-91, the 
post-reform period is 1995-2000. The transitional year 1993 is omitted. The upper panels in both 
tables look at the impact of the reform on low-income tax-payers (t<0.22) relative to the control 
group (t=0.22). The other two panels refer to the intermediate (t=0.27) and high-income 
taxpayers (t>0.27), again relative to the control group. 
Table 3 shows that the difference-in-difference estimates for the propensity to borrow are 
negative in all groups, regardless of marginal tax rate. In the medium and high income groups, 
for instance, the difference-in-difference estimates are -5.7 and -2.1 percentage points, 
respectively (and statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level), indicating that these 
group reduced participation more than those who were not affected by the reform. However, the 
result for the low-income group (-3.2 percent) is not consistent with the theory, which predicts 
that the group of low-income taxpayers should have increased participation relative to the control 
group. 
Table 4 documents another clash with the theory. The amount borrowed declines for low-
income taxpayers and increases among high-income taxpayers. Both results are the reverse of 
what theory predicts.
6 
We know from Section 3 that in 1993 the reform eliminated the possibility of interest 
deductions for mortgage co-signers. To see the effect of this further aspect of the tax reform, 
denote by  () i i r f t - 1  the price of mortgage debt before the reform and  () ' ' 1 i i r f t -  the price after 
the reform.
7 The price change is  () i i i i r f t f t - - ' ' , which can be decomposed as: 
 
                                                 
6 Results are similar when we examine the separate effect  of the 1992 reform. In this experiment the pre-reform 
period is 1987-91 and the post-reform period is just 1993. The control group includes taxpayers with a marginal tax 
rate of 27 percent. There are two treatment groups, rich taxpayers, with a marginal tax rate above 27 percent, and 
poor taxpayers with a marginal tax rate below that threshold. 
7 Household's i fraction of deductible interests  i f is defined in Section 3, and for simplicity we assume no change in 
the mortgage interest rate after the reform.   12 
() () [] i i i i i i r t f f f t t - + - - ' ' 
 
The first term in the square brackets is the effect of changing the rate at which mortgage 
interests are deducted, for given deductibility limit, while the second is the effect of changing the 
deductibility limit, for given deduction rate. 
We know that after the reform  22 . 0 '= i t  for all i, so that () 0 ' = - i i i f t t  for individuals in 
the t=0.22 tax bracket, positive for individuals in lower tax brackets, and negative for the highest 
brackets. On the other hand, () 0 ' = - i i i t f f  for single-taxpayer households and () 0 ' £ - i i i t f f  for 
households with multiple-taxpayers.  
This additional feature of the tax reform has several implications. First, the control group in 
Tables 3 and 4 includes households that, at least in principle, are not neutral with respect to the 
reform. Moreover, for single taxpayer households in high tax brackets (t > 0.22), () 0 ' < - i i i f t t  
and  () 0 ' = - i i i t f f , while for multiple-taxpayer households () 0 ' < - i i i f t t  and () 0 ' £ - i i i t f f , 
implying a stronger negative effect of the reform for the latter group. Finally, for single taxpayers 
in the lowest tax bracket (t = 0.1), () 0 ' > - i i i f t t  and () 0 ' = - i i i t f f , while for multiple taxpayers 
() 0 ' > - i i i f t t  and () 0 ' £ - i i i t f f , implying that, in principle, the tax reform might have an 
ambiguous effect on the price of borrowing for the latter group. 
To address these issues we redefine our control group to include only single taxpayer 
households with t=0.22, create a new treatment group (multiple taxpayers with t = 0.22, where 
we would expect the effect of the tax reform to be negative), and separate the three treatment 
groups of Tables 3 and 4 (with t=0.10, t=0.27, and t>0.27) into single- and multiple-taxpayers 
households. To check whether the effect of the reform is stronger among multiple income 
households, we assume sampling independence and test the null hypothesis of no difference 
between groups against the alternative that the difference is consistent with the theory of portfolio 
taxation. 
The results, reported in Table 5, are qualitatively similar to those obtained ignoring the 
change in the deductibility limit. There is an across-the-board decline in the proportion of 
mortgage borrowers that is at variance with the theory’s predictions. Moreover, the amount   13 
borrowed declines among the poor and increases among the rich, again in contrast with the 
theory.  
For any given tax bracket, one should expect a stronger effect of the reform on households 
with multiple earners, providing a further dimension to test the effect of the reform. For instance, 
one would expect that multiple income households with t>0.27 reduced the propensity to borrow 
more than single income households in the same tax bracket. In contrast, the difference results 
indicate that they reduce the propensity to borrow less than single income households. Results for 
other groups and for the amount borrowed are qualitatively similar, and do not signal group-
specific different reactions to the reform in the direction expected by the theory. The tests 
presented in the last column confirm that there is no significant difference between single- and 
multiple taxpayers, conditioning on any given tax group.  
There are several reasons why the difference-in-difference estimates may not pin down the 
effect of the tax reform. First, the effect could be diluted because other determinants of 
borrowing induce different behavior across groups: one possibility is that there are events, other 
than tax reforms, that provide alternative explanations for the results. Second, the difference-in-
difference estimator does not handle the analysis of the decision to borrow properly, because the 
estimated probabilities of having a mortgage do not necessarily lie in the [0,1] range. Third, 
trends in outcomes specific to groups may produce changes as a function of time per se, not of 
the tax reform. By the same token, differential trends in treatment and control groups that change 
in different ways for treatment and control group (for instance, a time trend in the treatment 
group that is not present in the control group) may be responsible for the results. Finally, we have 
not contemplated the potential impact of borrowing constraints. Some households (especially 
those in the lowest tax brackets) may be denied loans and have no access to credit. In the next 
section we turn to probit and Heckman selectivity analysis for the decision to borrow and the 
amount borrowed, controlling for other household characteristics, group-specific trends in 
outcomes, and borrowing constraints. 
 
6. Regression results 
   14 
To translate the difference-in-difference approach into a regression equation, we consider 
two time periods, t and t', and groups of borrowers affected or unaffected by the reforms. The 
demand for mortgage debt in the pre-reform period is: 
 
s g i s g i s g i j j j u X b , , , Î Î Î + = q  
 
for j=0 (the control group), 1,…, k (the treatment groups). The term  s g i j u , Î  captures variability in 
the demand for mortgage debt not explained by observable demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics  s g i j X , Î . We assume that in the pre-reform period: 
 
t g i g t t g i j j j v f u , , Î Î + + = b  
 
while in the post-reform period: 
 
{} ' , ' ' , 0 t g i g g t t g i j j j j v j f u Î Î + ¹ ´ + + = 1 d b  
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The group dummies 
j g D  and the time dummy Dt' measure, respectively, permanent 
differences between groups and shifts due to common time effects. The interaction terms  t g D D
j  
identify the impact of the reform ( 0 <
j g d for rich taxpayers and  0 >
j g d  for poor taxpayers). In 
contrast to the difference-in-difference approach, this framework allows us to consider additional 
explanatory variables that affect mortgage debt and to control for group-specific time trends.   15 
The specification (1) neglects the effect of the change in the deductibility limit that affects 
differently single- and multiple-taxpayer households. To account for this further aspect of the 
reform, rewrite the demand for mortgage debt in the pre-reform period as: 
 
t n g i n g t t n g i j j j v f u , , , , Î Î + + + = g b  
 
where n=s, m (single- and multiple-taxpayer households). The parameters gs and gm measure 
long-run differences in the demand for mortgage debt of single- vs. multiple-taxpayers. The 
demand in the post-reform period is: 
 
' , , , ' ' , , t n g i n g n g t t n g i j j j j v f u Î Î + + + + = d g b  
 
where the control group has been re-defined to include only single-taxpayer households, so that 
0
0 º s g d . The reduced form demand for mortgage debt is therefore: 
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where the dummies Dm and Ds=1-Dm are for single- and multiple-taxpayer households, 
respectively. The interaction terms  ' t n g D D D
j  identify the effect of the reform ( 0 , > n g j d  for poor 
taxpayers,  0 , < n g j d  for rich taxpayers, and  s g m g j j , , d d <  for all tax groups). 
To introduce the regression results, Table 6 reports sample averages for households with 
and without a home mortgage in the pooled 1987-2000 sample (omitting 1993). On average, 
people with a mortgage are younger, more educated, more likely to have children and being   16 
married, and their family income is higher. Average mortgage debt, conditional on having a 
mortgage, is about 15,000 Euro. 
Table 7 reports regression results for the probability of having debt. Column (1) reports the 
result of estimating the basic specification (1) with demographic controls (age dummies, 
education, region dummies and family size), year dummies, tax bracket dummies, income 
quintile dummies, group-specific time trends, and the interaction of group and post-reform 
dummy. As explained above, the latter should capture the effect of 1992-1994 tax reforms for the 
different treatment groups involved. Column (2) expands further the specification to test for 
different tax reform effects for households with one or multiple income recipients (as per 
equation 2). 
In both regressions there is either no detectable effect of the tax reform on the propensity to 
borrow, or a pattern that is at variance with the theory of portfolio taxation. In Table 7 we report 
only the effect of the variables of interest. The other coefficients indicate that the propensity to 
borrow declines with age and in the South, increases with income, education and family size. 
Group-specific time trends are positive for people at the bottom of the income distribution, and 
negative at the top. 
Since the survey does not allow us to distinguish between first-time buyers (who are 
eligible for the tax incentive) from repeat buyers, we restrict the sample to those under 45 or 
under 40, again finding no impact for the reform. 
We also estimate Heckman selectivity regression estimates for the amount borrowed. Since 
it is difficult to single out variables that affect the decision to borrow but not the amount 
borrowed, identification is achieved introducing a full set of regional dummies in the selectivity 
equation or via functional form, replacing income and age dummies in the selectivity equation 
with income and age levels. In no case do we find the interaction dummies to be statistically 
significant or even economically in agreement with the sign predictions of the theory. 
These estimates can be criticized because we have not taken into account the potential 
impact of borrowing constraints. In the group of low income households, lack of tax effects 
might be due to the fact that these people have no access to credit, so that the availability of more 
generous tax incentives after 1992 does not affect their borrowing decisions because it does not 
ease the borrowing constraint. While the argument is valid in principle, in practice it cannot   17 
explain the lack of effect among high-income individuals who should not be affected by 
borrowing constraints.  
Nevertheless, we check the empirical relevance of this argument by estimating a probit 
regression only for a sample of unconstrained individuals. To classify households into 
constrained and unconstrained, we use information on the proportion of households turned down 
for credit or discouraged from borrowing, available in each year from 1987 to 2000.
8 We then 
estimate a bivariate probit model for the probability of not being liquidity constrained and for the 
probability of having mortgage debt. The results, omitted for brevity, are similar to those reported 





Before 1992 mortgage interest was fully tax deductible up to 3,500 Euro (7,000 for two 
cosigners). In 1992-94 the Italian government implemented a series of tax reforms whose 
ultimate effect was to cancel the relation between the after-tax mortgage rate and the marginal tax 
rate. In the new regime the tax incentive applies to only one taxpayer and is proportional to the 
interests paid regardless of the marginal tax rate. This cancellation of incentives should have 
reduced the propensity to borrow of high-income taxpayers relative to other population groups 
and of multiple income households relative to single income. 
In contrast, we find no evidence that tax considerations shape the demand for mortgage 
debt, either at the extensive or the intensive margin. The most likely explanation for the absence 
of response to these substantial changes in the incentives to borrow is lack of financial 
information in general, and awareness of the specific changes in tax incentives in the mortgage 
market in particular. In fact, in comparison with other industrialized countries, Italy lags behind 
                                                 
8 We estimate the probability that a household might be denied credit or discouraged from borrowing 
relying on information available in the SHIW. In each year we have information on households that, while 
needing credit to finance expenditures on non-durables and durable goods, did not apply for a loan in the 
reference survey year because expected to be refused, or applied for a loan, but were rejected. We define   18 
in terms of financial information. The Annual Survey of the World Competitiveness Indicator 
indicates that Italy ranks 38
th and 43
th out of the 49 countries examined in terms of economic 
literacy and education in finance among the population. On a 1 to 10 scale, Italy receives a score 
of 3.98 in economic literacy and 3.73 in education, much lower values than, to name a few, the 
US, Sweden, Netherlands, Australia and Japan (all above 6).
9 This might explain also why our 
findings contrast with the US literature, where there is broad consensus that cancellation of tax 
incentives for consumer credit have induced portfolio shifts towards mortgages, and that people 
took advantage of the loophole created by the 1986 TRA. 
This lack of responsiveness to tax incentives has important implications not only for the 
design and marketing of mortgage instruments, but in other areas as well. For instance, pension 
reforms rely crucially on tax incentives to stimulate retirement saving in individual accounts and 
pension funds contributions. To the extent that people are not aware or do not understand fully 
the implications of these incentives, one should expect limited growth of pension funds, at least 
initially. In this respect, reforms that raise financial institutions' transparency and the overall level 
of financial information can be expected to have great impact on household portfolios. 
                                                                                                                                                              
these two groups of households as credit-constrained. Similar questions are posed in the US Survey of 
Consumer Finances. 
9 The 1995 and 1998 SHIW elicit data on the respondents' awareness about 17 financial assets. Guiso and 
Jappelli (2002) provide evidence that Italian households lack basic financial information. For instance, 
about two thirds of respondents are not aware of stocks, and about 50 percent of mutual funds. We don't 
have specific data, but find it highly plausible that information on mortgage characteristics is also poor, 
and that understanding of the tax treatment of mortgages and of the changes introduced by 1992-94 
reforms is not common among potential borrowers. 





Chiuri, Maria Concetta, and Tullio Jappelli (2001), "Financial market imperfections and home 
ownership: a comparative study," European Economic Review (forthcoming), 
http://www.dise.unisa.it/WP/wp44.pdf 
 
Engen, Eric M., and William G. Gale (1996), "Tax-preferred assets and debt, and the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986: some implications for fundamental tax reform," National Tax Journal 49, 331-
39. 
 
Dunsky, Robert M., and James R. Follain, (1997), "The demand for mortgage debt and the 
income tax," Journal of Housing Research 8, 155-200. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, and Tullio Jappelli (2002), "Financial information and household portfolios," CSEF 
Discussion Paper n. 92. 
 
Hendershott, Patric H., Gwilym Pryce, and Michael White (2002), “Household leverage and the 
deductibility of home mortgage interest: evidence from the UK house purchasers,” NBER 
Working Paper n. 9207. 
  
Jappelli, Tullio, and Luigi Pistaferri (2002), "Tax incentives and the demand for life insurance: 
evidence from Italy," Journal of Public Economics (forthcoming), 
http://www.dise.unisa.it/WP/wp52.pdf 
 
Maki, Dean M. (2001), "Household debt and the Tax Reform Act of 1986," American Economic 
Review 91, 305-19. 
  
Poterba, James M. (2001), "Taxation and portfolio structure: issues and implications," in 
Household Portfolios, Luigi Guiso, Michalis Haliassos and Tullio Jappelli editors. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Skinner, Jonathan, and Daniel Feenberg, (1990), "The impact of the 1986 Tax Reform on 
personal saving," in Do Taxes Matter? The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, edited by 
Joel Slemrod. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Scholz, John Karl (1994), "Tax progressivity and household portfolios: descriptive evidence from 
the Survey of Consumer Finances," in Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality, Joel 
Slemrod editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
   20 
Table 1 
The reform of mortgage interest deductions 
 
 
  Price of mortgage debt 
 
Limit  Joint contracts 
1982-1992  r(1-t*f)  L£3,500  The 3,500 limit applies to each tax-payer co-signing 
the contract 
 
1993-1994  r(1-0.27*f) 
 
L£3,500 
1995-1997  r(1-0.22*f) 
 
L£3,500 
1998-2000  r(1-0.19*f) 
 
L£3,500 
For contracts signed before 1993, the 3,500-euro limit 
applies to each taxpayer co-signing the contract. For 
contracts signed after 1993, the 3,500 limit applies to 





Tax brackets and marginal tax rates, 1987-2000 
 




1987-1988 1989-90  1991  1992-2000 
Tax bracket  Marginal 
tax rate 
Tax bracket  Marginal 
tax rate 
Tax bracket  Marginal 
tax rate 
Tax bracket  Marginal 
tax rate 
£3.10  0.12  £3.30  0.10  £3.51  0.10  £3.72  0.10 
3.10-5.68 0.22  3.30-6.56  0.22  3.51-6.97  0.22  3.72-7.44  0.22 
5.68-14.46 0.27  6.56-16.43  0.26  6.97-17.41  0.27  7.44-15.50  0.27 
14.46-25.82 0.34  16.43-32.90  0.33  17.41-34.92  0.34  15.50-30.99  0.34 
25.82-51.65 0.41  32.90-82.18  0.40  34.92-87.19  0.41  30.99-77.48  0.41 
51.65-77.47 0.48  82.18-164.41  0.45  87.19-74.43  0.46  77.48-154.96  0.46 
77.47-154.94 0.53  >164.41  0.50  >174.43  0.51  >154.96  0.51 
154.94-309.87 0.58            
>309.87 0.62             
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Table 3 
Difference-in-difference results: proportion of borrowers 
 
The three panels report difference-in-difference results for the proportion of borrowers. The difference-in-difference 
estimate is reported in the bottom right cell of each panel. The pre-reform period is 1987-1991, and the post-reform 
period is 1995-2000. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
 
Low-income tax-payers (t=0.10) 
 
  t=0.10 t =0.22  Difference between groups 





















Medium-income tax-payers (t = 0.27) 
 
  t > 0.27  t = 0.22  Difference between groups 





















High-income tax-payers (t > 0.27) 
 
  t > 0.27  t = 0.22  Difference between groups 
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Table 4 
Difference-in-difference results: debt amount 
 
The three panels report difference-in-difference results for the amount of debt (in thousand Euro), conditioning on 
having a mortgage. The difference-in-difference estimate is reported in the bottom right cell of each panel. The pre-
reform period is 1987-1991, and the post-reform period is 1995-2000. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Low-income tax-payers (t=0.10) 
 
  t=0.10 t =0.22  Difference between groups 





















Medium-income tax-payers (t=0.27) 
 
  t=0.27 t =0.22  Difference between groups 





















High-income tax-payers (t>0.27) 
 
  t>0.270 t =0.22  Difference between groups 
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Table 5 
Difference-in-difference estimates: 
single and multiple taxpayers 
 
The table reports difference-in-difference estimates for the propensity to borrow and the debt amount (in thousand 
Euro), conditioning on having a mortgage. The pre-reform period is 1987-1991 and the post-reform period is 1995-
2000. The control group consists of single taxpayer households with t=0.22. In the last column we test the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between single and multiple taxpayer households within a given tax group, 
against the alternative that the effect is lower among multiple taxpayer households. 
 
  Treatment group  Standard 
error 








t=0.10  Single -0.013  0.012   
 Multiple -0.031  0.020  0.27 
t=0.22  Single  Control group   
  Multiple 0.024  0.011  -.- 
t=0.27  Single -0.045  0.008   
 Multiple -0.047  0.008  0.44 






 Multiple -0.002  0.010 
 
0.90 
t=0.10  Single -44.96  32.01   
 Multiple -33.04  13.55  0.63 
t=0.22  Single  Control group   
  Multiple -1.51  12.27  -.- 
t=0.27  Single -10.46  11.90   




t>0.27  Single -0.76  11.29   
   Multiple 
 






The table reports sample statistics from the 1987-2000 SHIW (omitting 1993). Statistics are computed using sample 




With mortgage  No mortgage  Total sample 
Age 46.33  55.73  54.91 
Years of schooling  10.31  7.72  7.95 
Resident in the South  0.34  0.42  0.41 
Family size  3.31  2.76  2.81 
More than one taxpayer  0.68  0.53  0.55 
Disposable income  22,062  15,535  16,105 
Mortgage debt  15,327  0  1,339 
Observations 3,778  36,094  39,872   24 
Table 7 
Regressions results: Probit estimates 
 
Each regression also includes age dummies, years of schooling, resident in the South, family size, income quintile 
dummies, year dummies and group-specific time trends (for t=0.10, t=0.22, t=0.27, and t>0.27). The number of 
observations is 39,872. The sample period is 1987-2000, excluding 1993. The coefficients indicate marginal effects; 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
  With demographics  With demographics and  
dummies  
for multiple  income recipients 












t=0.10, after the reform  -0.0367 
(-0.93) 
 
t=0.27, after the reform  0.0454  
(1.36) 
 























t=0.27, after the reform, multiple income 
 
0.0697   
(1.74) 

















The price of mortgages, 1982-2000 
 
In the top panel we plot the after-tax interest rate on a mortgage for a borrower paying interests of 3,500 Euro for 10 
years. In the lowe panel we plot the after-tax interest rate on a mortgage for a household paying interests of 7,000 
Euro for 10 years, distinguishing between one- and two-taxpayers households. In both panels we assume that the 


























Marginal tax rate 
 1982-92, Two taxpayers   1982-92, One taxpayer 
 1993-94, All groups   1995-97, All groups 
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Figure 2 
The debt-income ratio, 1987-2000 
 
The figure plots the total debt-income ratio estimated from financial accounts data and the mortgage-income ratio 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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